This memo to the Director of CIA indicates that what would be the recommendation of the Robertson Panel was already determined a year before: flying saucers cause to threats to the national security: one psychological threat (risks of mass panic may be exploited by the "ennemi"), and the other an air security threat (neglect of UFO alerts may cause neglect of "ennemy" air attacks.)
It also shows that CIA estimated current efforts of UFO research insufficient as far as national security is concerned and that the problem must be escalated to higher levels.
Title: | FLYING SAUCERS (WITH MEMO ATTACHED DATED 520924, SUBJECT: FLYING SAUCERS) |
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Pages: | 1 |
Pub Date: | February 10, 1952 |
Release Date: | November 17, 1978 |
Case Number: | F-1975-03653 |
Release Decision: | RIPPUB |
Classification: | Unclassified |
ER - 3 - 2872
OCT 2 1952
MEMORANDUM TO: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Deputy Director (Intelligence)
FROM: Assistant Director, Office of Scientific Intelligence
SUBJECT: Flying Saucers
1. PROBLEM
To determine (a) Whether or not there are national security implications in the problem of "unidentified flying objects"; (b) whether or not adequate study and research is currently being directed to this problem in its relation to such national security implications; and (c) what further investigation and research should be instituted, by whom, and under what aegis.
2. FACTS AND DISCUSSION
OSI has investigated the work currently being performed on "flying saucers" and found that the Air Technical Intelligence Center, DI, USAF, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, is the only group devoting appreciable effort and study to this subject, that ATIC is concentrating on a case-by-case explanation of each report, and that this effort is not adequate to correlate, evaluate, and resolve the situation on an overall basis. The current problem is discussed in TAB A.
3. CONCLUSIONS
"Flying saucers" pose two elements of danger which have national security implications. The first involves mass psychological considerations and the second concerns the vulnerability of the United States to air attack. Both factors are amplified in TAB A.
4. ACTION RECOMMENDED
(a) that the Director of Central Intelligence advise the National Security Council of the implications of the "flying saucers" problem and request that research be initiated. TAB B is a draft memorandum to the NSC, for the DCI's signature. (b) That the DCI discuss this subject with the Psychological Strategic Board. A memorandum to the Director, Psychological Strategy Board, is attached for signature as TAB C. (c) That CIA, with the cooperation of PSB and other interested departments and agencies, develop and recommend for adoption by the NSC a